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Abstract
There is a growing recognition that nonsuicidal self-injury commonly incorpo-
rates communicative and interactional dimensions. But regardless of whether we 
approach self-injury within the terms of deliberate interpersonal communication, it 
is undeniably something that conveys a significant impact into the social and com-
municative field between people. As such, it is something that can be approached 
and analysed as communicative in this more general sense. In this paper, we draw on 
13 in-depth qualitative interviews with the parents of people who self-injure, con-
ducted for a larger pilot study, to explore some of these more general communicative 
processes, spaces and impacts associated with self-injury. By providing a phenom-
enologically informed examination of parents’ experiences, we argue that self-injury 
is in fact a richly communicative phenomenon, albeit one that cannot be adequately 
mapped using the traditional sender–receiver communication paradigm. To provide 
a more nuanced mapping, we look beyond this paradigm to include more subtle, 
ambiguous, pre-reflexive and bodily forms of communication. Indeed, self-injury 
offers a particularly powerful case study with which to think through a more com-
plex model of communication, one that connects the interpersonal, intersubjective 
and intercorporeal levels, and that, as such, is more appropriate to the sociologies of 
everyday life and embodiment.
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[B]odily behaviour is meaningful, it is intentional, and as such it is neither 
internal nor external, but rather beyond this artificial distinction - Dan Zahavi 
(2001, p. 153)
Introduction
Research on nonsuicidal self-injury tends to be dominated by an almost exclusive 
focus on the individuality of the person who self-injures. Where social context is 
considered, it is usually cast as a set of secondary biographical correlates to the pri-
mary inner facts of the matter; with the figure of the individual taken as both the 
sole cause and exclusive site of the self-injury (Chandler 2016; Steggals 2015). So 
embedded is this individualistic framing, that examples of self-injury perceived to 
be insufficiently private, and therefore individual, are commonly dismissed as inau-
thentic and ‘attention-seeking’ (Chandler 2016; Scourfield et  al. 2011; Steggals 
et al. 2020). However, while a focus on the inner condition of the person is clearly 
important (Klonsky 2006), the exclusivity of this focus is both historically contin-
gent (Millard 2013) and empirically questionable (Brossard 2018; Chandler 2016; 
Steggals 2015). One potential challenge to this exclusivity has come from research 
that suggests self-injury may contain interpersonal as well as intrapsychic elements 
(Brown et al. 2002; Nock 2008; Nock and Prinstein 2004, 2005; Rodham et al. 2004; 
Turner et al. 2012). We have ourselves recently written on this (Steggals et al. 2020), 
and have argued that self-injury should be thought of as both a personal and a social 
practice; one that often incorporates an important relational, interactional or—oth-
erwise put—a communicative dimension. But regardless of whether we should 
approach self-injury (at least partially) in terms of interpersonal communication, it 
is undeniably something that significantly impacts on the social and communica-
tive field that exists between people (Noch, 2008; Steggals et al. 2020; Turner et al. 
2012). As such, self-injury is something that can be approached and analysed as 
communicative in this more general sense. And it is toward this more general sense 
that we turn in this article.
Of course, what we mean by ‘communication’ is of central importance here. In 
the relevant academic literatures, communication has consistently been a contested 
concept (Dance 1970; MacKay 1972). However, within this contested theoretical 
space, a strongly influential tradition, paradigmatically associated with Shannon and 
Weaver’s highly linear model (1949), restricts communication to only one part of the 
full range of informative, expressive and indexical performances that people gener-
ate. Within this paradigm communication is a conscious and deliberate act which 
transmits representational information from one person (the sender) to another (the 
receiver). According to this paradigm, self-injury is not communicative, unless it is 
performed with the active and conscious intention to transmit a particular message 
to someone capable of decoding it—precisely the idea of self-injury that is com-
monly put in question by terms like ‘inauthentic’ and ‘attention-seeking’.
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However, much recent work in communication studies has problematised this 
linear, sender–receiver paradigm (Meyer et  al. 2017). The notion of a monadic, 
bounded and utterly private individual that acts as a ‘signalling device by which cog-
nitive states, intentions, and mental imagery are expressed’ has been challenged. In 
its place we find a more ‘holistic or multimodal’ appreciation of how ‘an interacting 
human body resonates, entrains, or even merges with another’ (Meyer et al. 2017, 
p. xv). This latter perspective, influenced by both Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology 
(1962, 1968, 1971) and Goffman’s interactional sociology (1963, 1967) pictures a 
kind of shared co-embodied system (Bateson 1972): a matrix of communication and 
coordination within which everyday life is pursued and interactions facilitated, but 
which nonetheless remains largely unnoticed in the taken-for-granted background 
of conscious awareness. According to this alternative paradigm, though we may not 
realise it, ‘we cannot stop communicating’ (Goffman 1963, p. 35) and so the idea 
of self-injury as a completely individual, secret and private practice that lacks any 
communicative dimension, may be as fundamentally unworkable as the idea of a 
strictly private language (Wittgenstein 2009 [1958]).
In this article, we explore some of the communicative processes, spaces and 
impacts associated with self-injury, utilising a phenomenologically informed exami-
nation of parents’ experiences of living and interacting with children who self-
injure. We argue that, beneath the level of interpersonal communication the social 
life of self-injury is rich with complex, subtle but often ambiguous communicative 
activity. In order to understand this activity, we must move beyond our attachment 
to the sender–receiver paradigm and work with the newer multimodal approach. We 
must also move beyond the associated idea of the bounded and monadic individ-
ual, or what Elias famously called the homo clausus (Elias 1994 [1939]): replac-
ing its familiar dichotomies of the inside/outside and the private/public with a more 
fluid model of the always already intersubjective; and replacing its solid bounda-
ries with a more porous membrane of active, if not always fully conscious, com-
munication. In its place then, we propose something more like what O’Neill (1989) 
and Frank (1991) have called ‘the communicative body’. But it is important to note 
that approaching self-injury in this way does not mean denying that it is typically 
a deeply personal or even secret matter. Rather, it means acknowledging that nei-
ther our common ideas nor our scientific understanding of private life and personal 
secrets implies an absolute and hermetically sealed individualism (Manen and Lev-
ering 1996).
Methodology
The research reported here emerged from a 2016–2017 English pilot study that 
explored the degree to which significant relationships shape people’s practices and 
experiences of self-injury, and how these relationships are themselves affected and 
shaped by self-injury. Twenty-six in-depth qualitative interviews (20 with women 
and 6 with men) were conducted with both people who self-injure (n = 9), people 
who are in relationships with people who self-injure (n = 12), and people who have 
had both experiences (n = 6). The overall aim was to better understand and describe 
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the interaction between self-injury and the key relationships forming its immediate 
social context. We interviewed nine mothers and three fathers, ranging from 43 to 
75 in age. Ten of these parents had not themselves self-injured, while two of them 
had their own history of self-injury. The analysis presented here represents one key 
strand of the findings from the overall study.
Our analysis of the communicative life of self-injury is structured by reference 
to three levels of possible communication: the interpersonal, the intersubjective1 
and the intercorporeal. These three conceptual lenses are used to disclose and ana-
lyse the communicative dimension present within our participants’ accounts, as 
well as to understand how reflexively aware they were of such communicative pro-
cesses and their effects. Though, as already mentioned, we have put the question of 
whether self-injury can ever be thought of as an unambiguously deliberate inter-
personal communication to one side for the purposes of this article, it is necessary 
nonetheless to look at what is going on at the level of interpersonal communication 
where self-injury can be correlated with changing patterns of normative and linguis-
tic interaction. Intersubjective communication describes the range of reflexive and 
expressive practices that facilitate interpersonal communication, but which are char-
acterised by an ambiguity in communicative intent. And intercorporeal communica-
tion describes multiple pre-reflexive processes that allow one body to resonate with 
another, creating the communicative context of a visceral ‘we’ that enables more 
explicit and reflexive forms of communication to occur (Meyer et al. 2017; Schutz 
and Luckmann 1973). Following Merleau-Ponty then, we treat intercorporeality as a 
more primary and basic form of inter-bodily connection than intersubjectivity, which 
he associated with the imagined construction of the other within the ego structure of 
the self (see for example, 1968, p. 180; also Loenhoff 2017). Taken together, these 
three levels of communication comprise a holistic approach that necessitates a move 
away from the sender–receiver communication paradigm, along with the idea of the 
homo clausus that underpins it. Below we apply each level of our analytic model to 
our empirical data, and ultimately demonstrate our argument that while self-injury 
may be experienced as intensely personal, it must nonetheless be understood as 
something that is also richly communicative.
Interpersonal communication
Self-injury has often been connected by researchers and clinicians to a breakdown 
in interpersonal communication, the ‘failed promise’ (Kilby 2001) of normative lan-
guage to support social recognition (Frank 1991). Nock, for example, has argued 
that in some cases self-injury may function as a kind of ‘high intensity social signal’ 
used to communicate in circumstances where other communication strategies such 
as talking, yelling, and crying are perceived to have failed (2008, p. 159). Self-injury 
1 Our approach is one of sociological rather than philosophical phenomenology. As such our use of the 
term ‘intersubjective’ is empirical rather than eidetic.
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can ‘voice things that cannot be said’ (Pembroke 1996, p. 45), becoming what 
Hewitt calls ‘the language of blood and pain’ (Hewitt 1997, p. 58).
Those beginning a period of self-injury often withdraw from others and cease 
their normal patterns of communication, which typically represents the first impact 
of self-injury on the communicative field of the family. The parents who contributed 
to this study routinely reported such a withdrawal, occurring even before the self-
injury became known. Usually, this was interpreted as an expected part of parent-
ing a teenager. Rabindra for example reports that his teenage son, Carl, became less 
communicative but noted ‘you put that down to er, growing up, because you start 
developing your own interests and hanging out with your friends and whatever. So, I 
didn’t sort of think there was anything unusual’. Unusual or not, this experience can 
be a traumatic transformation for parents. Paula noticed a change in her daughter 
Mary at around 14 years of age: ‘it was like one moment I had this little girl and the 
next moment I had this... stranger... This really angry stranger. And like, what hap-
pened? What, what happened in such a short space of time? And, and it was almost 
like you grieved’.
Rachel, a 47-year-old, single mother of two daughters, struggled with changes 
in her youngest daughter’s behaviour when she, Mia, became more withdrawn and 
less communicative at age 13 or 14. Rachel also understood this as a natural part 
of the growing process, a manifestation of teenage angst and the desire to renego-
tiate the child-parent relationship, but eventually discovered that this social with-
drawal helped Mia hide her depression, suicidal feelings and self-injury. After Mia’s 
self-injury has been discovered, the breakdown in normative language spread from 
daughter to mother. As Rachel explains: ‘I couldn’t really say the words... I couldn’t 
use the word ‘self-harm’, I couldn’t, or ‘hurt yourself’, or ‘cut yourself’; I couldn’t 
use those words, they couldn’t come out of my mouth, they were too painful’. Lan-
guage had become highly sensitised, charged and even dangerous.
Other parents reported similar concerns about the use of words in the context of 
self-injury. Barbara, a 43-year-old mother of a teenager who had been self-injuring, 
noted ‘I just felt like anything I said would be the wrong thing to say’. Rabindra 
and his wife, Ingrid, who were interviewed separately, echoed this sentiment. Ingrid 
explained that when she found out about Carl’s self-injury ‘it left me speechless’. 
For the eleven years since, during which Carl continued to self-injure, she described 
her experience as.
walking on eggshells because you don’t know what you can say to him or not, 
because you don’t know whether it will set something off so you don’t know 
whether you would say to, you could say to him the same things you could say 
to the other two [of her children] without there being a backlash of some form 
or other, because he won’t necessarily argue it out with you, and I find that 
quite frustrating . . . with Carl you always feel like you’ve got to approach it 
from a slightly sideways angle and sort of, you know, it’s like, it’s almost like 
you need to put him in a sort of safe place in a padded cell first so that, you 
know, he feels secure and you sort of come out with 35% of what you want to 
say, hope that he reads a little bit between the lines and that 50% of what you 
want to say actually gets delivered
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The failure of, and sensitisation to, normative language, together with the associ-
ated social withdrawal, represent a partial collapse of interpersonal communica-
tion within a particular relationship network—such as the family home. Such dis-
turbances in the communicative field are inevitably communicative in themselves. 
Rabindra for example explains.
we now know conditions, circumstances, patterns of behaviour that we think 
we know that something is coming . . . We’re quite sort of, your nose gets 
attuned to it . . . We can pick it up in different ways um, we all, usually if we’re 
down in the country [at their second home while Carl remains at their first] 
we’ll speak at least once a day type of thing, once every couple of days, and 
if we haven’t heard from him for a week, or we try to call him and he hasn’t 
called back you know something’s up.
In this way, something as thoroughly uncommunicative as a resolutely closed door, 
which appears to be a refusal to communicate, becomes a communication in itself 
and takes on great significance—a drop in mood indicating a rise in danger. As 
Ingrid explains:
he’s got to the point where when things are really bad he’ll lock himself in his 
room for several days, you just don’t really see him . . . He’ll just disappear, 
you know he’ll come and get some drink and some food when you’re not in the 
room/the flat. Um, and you know he’s been around, he’s, he’s, you know, he’s 
alive, he’s out there, he’s up there but you won’t see him in the daytime, he 
won’t sit for a meal or, you know, he’s not hungry at that point, you know. You 
don’t know when he wakes up either, so he hides away. You know, it could be 
two or three days.
Intersubjective communication
Writing on self-injury, Kilby argues that, ‘if the promise of language fails and speak-
ing cannot sustain life, another ‘voice’ must be found, especially when faced with 
the need to testify to the traumatic conditions of life itself’ (2001, p. 125). This is 
the realm of what O’Neill (1989) and Frank (1991), writing more generally, call the 
‘communicative body’. When normative language can no longer support our need 
for social recognition, the body ‘breaks out of [the] codes’ that have silenced the 
subject and seeks ‘self-expression in a code of its own invention’ (Frank 1991, p. 
85). Self-injury could itself be (partially) understood in this way (Kilby 2001; Nock 
2008), as a kind of ‘bright red scream’ (Strong 2005). But the general pattern of eve-
ryday life is saturated in various signs, signals, and codes and these do not cease just 
because normative interpersonal communication has failed, and someone has begun 
to self-injure. Non-interpersonal activities like body-language fill the communica-
tive gaps left by the failure of normative language, supporting the bodily code and 
carrying its non-normative themes and content. Indeed, the power of self-injury to 
function as a bodily code may itself have an amplifying effect on the communica-
tive power of non-interpersonal communications. And it is not just bodies which are 
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communicative, but spaces also, such as the resolutely closed bedroom door noted 
above. A more developed, and possibly more deliberately communicative, example 
is described by Rachel:
I used to go into her bedroom and I’d, I’d look. I used to have a Monday off 
back then, and when she was at school on a Monday I used to go up to her bed-
room and just look to see if I could find anything she’d be hurting herself with 
in there . . . She used to keep them um, tiny little plastic bags with them in and 
she’d, she’d just hide them. And occasionally I’d find them like, Sellotaped-up 
to the top of the door frame and things like that . . . I’d asked her about them. 
I’d say: ‘oh I noticed, you know, you’ve got some blades in such and such a 
place’. But I never took them.
Crucially, while Rachel would not remove the razor blades she would let Mia know 
that she had found them. So, while these items were hidden from sight, Mia knew 
her mother was going into her room and nonetheless continued to leave items there 
to be found. This suggests a communicative process at work, where Mia’s bedroom 
works as an alternative bulletin board in which things left, and things discovered 
enabled an alternative mode of indirect communication. Indeed, Mia even told her 
Childhood and Adolescent Mental Health Services (CAMHS) worker to tell her 
mother where, in Mia’s bedroom, she could find some old suicide notes that she had 
written, something she could not talk to her mother about directly.
Paula described a similar situation with her daughter, Mary:
she started shutting herself away in her bedroom. Um, I’d clear the bedroom, 
I’d find the tissues um, with blood, and that used to bother me, used to make 
me feel sick. And then I found um, there was like letters and things where she 
kind of left them out, I think, for me to see . . . I was always looking for signs.
While Mia’s and Mary’s bedrooms did in fact become a kind of communicative 
zone, how intentional this communication was is ambiguous, and in turn, ambiguity 
is characteristic of intersubjective communication within the context of self-injury. 
For example, the moment that self-injury is disclosed to another is often marked 
by ambiguity. Rachel discovered Mia’s self-injury when Mia put on a ‘strappy little 
top’ and went sunbathing in the garden, revealing her arms and her scars:
I remember saying to her, my mum was outside, and I obviously didn’t want to 
draw attention, so I just said to her: ‘oh, can I, can we just go and have a chat 
inside in a minute?’ She knew I’d clocked it, she’d know, but she’d obviously, 
she’d put a strappy top on, so she must have known I was going to see that day 
. . . Um, so you know, whether that, that element was, you know, she was ready 
to, to share that information with me I guess.
Rachel clearly interprets Mia’s actions as deliberately communicative, but this is an 
interpretation and the ambiguity is obvious. Likewise, as Ingrid recalls.
the fact that [Carl] self-harmed only came to light . . . [b]ecause they were 
re-vamping the common room er, painting it, he happened to wear some 
short-sleeved t-shirts which then showed some scarring, at which point the 
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housemaster rang us and said, you know ‘were you aware?’ And we certainly 
weren’t.
[Steggals]: Yeah. So, there must have been a period where he was doing this 
very privately and nobody knew.
Ingrid: Yeah, he always has done to be honest. This is the first year since 
maybe six months ago where he doesn’t mind wandering around anywhere, 
except in front of his grandmother, with short sleeves on because the scarring 
on his left arm was quite substantial and some of it’s quite, quite deep and, 
um, but until then he always hid it and, you know, looking back at that time 
when we got the phone call, he’d have the occasional sort of sweatband that 
he’d wear. Um, seemed a bit weird but, you know, kids do all sorts of things. 
But when we look back, where he wore the sweatband you can now see that 
there’s scarring underneath, so he hid it and he wouldn’t wander around in a 
short-sleeved t-shirt and we’d say ‘good grief, it’s 25 degrees out there, what 
are you doing? You know, normally you’d wear shorts and a t-shirt, how come 
you’re wearing a shirt?’ And then you can add it all up afterwards. At the time: 
no idea.
While Carl’s wearing a t-shirt that day could have been a mistake, it does not fit 
the overall pattern of attentively hiding his scars, and so seems suspiciously like an 
intersubjective, albeit ambiguous, communication. Indeed, such ambiguity is quite 
characteristic in people’s reflections on the communicative status of self-injury. And 
this remains the case even when it is the person who self-injured who is reflecting 
on their own past actions. Perhaps ambiguity is not just a problem that clouds issues 
of intent and interpretation then, but an element of how such patterns of behaviour 
work as forms of communicative action, short-circuiting the weight and implications 
of more normative, obviously deliberate communication.
Intercorporeal communication
While we can recognise the ambiguity of both Mia’s actions when she wore the 
‘strappy top’, and Rachel’s interpretation of them, Rachel nevertheless does seem 
to feel that Mia’s actions were in some sense deliberate and that she had decided to 
share the secret of her self-injury. However, Rachel was not ready to share the secret 
with her own mother, Mia’s grandmother, and described controlling her own reac-
tion to the discovery of self-injury so as to not ‘draw [her mother’s] attention’. In 
fact, Rachel successfully kept Mia’s self-injury a secret, not just from Mia’s grand-
mother, but also from Mia’s father and Mia’s sister. Rachel didn’t see Mia’s disclo-
sure of self-injury as inauthentic, as now being shown rather than secret, or public 
rather than private. Rather, she re-drew the boundary of the secret and the private so 
that they stopped being wholly individual (to Mia) and now included herself as well.
So, while we may think of secrecy in self-injury as something being kept her-
metically sealed within the boundaries of the individual, our data suggest that 
a secret shared remains a secret nonetheless; carrying the same power to mark 
off social space as before. What changes is the division of who is marked off 
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as inside the secret, and who outside. Rachel became involved in some of the 
same practices and performances of secrecy that Mia has previously been pursu-
ing alone, albeit filtered and articulated through the social identity and concerns 
of the parent. And this includes the anxiety of discovery and sense of shame that 
comes with a secret stigma. Similarly, Barbara for example, told Steggals about 
how her daughter, Monica, was ready to drop the secret and consider her scars as 
part of her public identity, but for Barbara the scars were a source of embarrass-
ment and the judgmental gaze of outsiders:
Almost like she [daughter] had gone through it and she had dealt with it, and 
this is what she’s left with, and she’s not going to hide it and be ashamed of 
herself any more. And that’s how she felt, and I felt differently; I was think-
ing ‘just cover them up’ . . . Because I don’t want to have to deal with peo-
ple’s looks of her being judged and then me being judged. Because people 
do, they think ‘oh, they obviously haven’t been very good parents then, if 
they’ve done that. They haven’t kept them safe’ or ‘what sort of home life 
have they got if the children are doing that to themselves?’ And people do 
judge, and they make wrong judgements and assumptions.
Such anxiety involves complexity, as Donna (a woman in her early 60s with a 
teenage daughter) notes in her account of the ‘the burden of secrecy’:
There are a number of things going on. I have to respect Karen’s [daugh-
ter’s] right to privacy. But I so want to talk to somebody. I want to share and 
maybe get absolution from my listener who will tell me that I’m not a bad 
mother after all. And then again - maybe I’d rather do without the absolu-
tion and just keep the secret so that nobody else is tipped off to what a fail-
ure I’ve been. So, I want to keep the secret and I want to share it too.
This anxiety about being blamed is of course an entirely rational one, since par-
ents, especially mothers, are generally held to be responsible for bad things in a 
child’s life (though rarely credited for good ones: Lawler 2000). The well-being 
of the child, it is often assumed, is entirely within the gift of the parents, and 
especially the mother. As Ann-Marie Ambert has argued:
[W]hen one sees children, one ’sees’ parents. When one sees children who 
have problems, one looks for parents, especially mothers. When one seeks 
solutions to children’s problems ... one immediately turns to parents who are 
then scrutinized by a variety of establishments (Ambert 1994, p. 530)
The mothers in our study can hardly be unaware of this, and Donna’s wish for ‘abso-
lution’ is entirely understandable, as is her contrary wish to keep her ‘failure’ secret. 
And her daughter, similarly, is likely to be aware of the patterns of knowledge and 
scrutiny in which both mother and daughter are bound up. This can mean a complex 
relationship with the health professionals who entered several participants’ lives: 
welcomed as a source of help, their presence may equally have brought the most 
profound anxieties about being ‘blamed’. Paula’s discussion of her daughter Mary’s 
experiences with a CAMHS worker speaks to some of these issues:
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she got really cross with him [CAMHS worker] because he wasn’t focused on 
that [points to forearm] he was more focused on her relationship with me and 
her dad . . . And the whole session and at the end of it she said ‘look, can we 
leave my parents out of this? They’re great. This isn’t about them, this is about 
me and I’ve got other issues going on at school, and boys and whatever’ and 
she didn’t go back after that. She said it was like he was always trying to put 
words in my mouth. She said ‘I didn’t like it’. He was searching for something 
that wasn’t there.
This looks at first sight like self-justification, and possibly it is. But Paula was highly 
reflexive about her mothering and did in fact blame herself (she said for example 
that she had altered her mode of relating to Mary). In addition, parental influence is 
unlikely to be the only factor in a young person’s desire to self-injure. Furthermore, 
alongside secrecy and shame, parents typically experienced anxiety and the sense of 
a familiar world becoming strange and threatening. Once she discovered Mia’s self-
injury, Rachel explained that:
I used to go round my house and look at every potential danger. She could 
burn herself on a light bulb, she could do anything. I could not take, I couldn’t 
safeguard her, and at that, I used to get so frustrated about that because I used 
to literally walk round my house and look at everything and just think ‘well, 
she could hurt herself on that’ . . . there’s no way you could remove everything 
that she could harm herself with. You know, you’d lock away the paracetamol 
and the drugs and you’d, you know, there was a point where I kind of, very 
sharp knives, they, they went out the house. I locked them in the garage, you 
know . . . And I just thought: ‘why am I doing this? Because, actually, there’s 
toilet cleaner there, there’s bleach; I cannot remove everything from this house 
that she could, you know, either hurt herself with or poison herself with or, 
you know, I can’t do it.
At a more general level, Rabindra described the ‘nose’ that he and Ingrid developed, 
a kind of permanent vigilance, tuned in to the communicative field of the household, 
waiting for signs of a coming episode of self-injury. Experiences of anxiety and 
shame, and the practices and concerns of secrecy, may not seem overtly communi-
cative. But when taken with the kind of anxiety, estrangement from the familiar, and 
constant vigilance that we discussed previously, they represent an interesting case 
of communication, in the way that a disease may be communicated or passed on, a 
vector for negative affect. These feelings, concerns, dilemmas and sensitivities are, 
while filtered and mediated by the parental role, nonetheless the same feelings and 
sensitivities that are traditionally associated with someone who is self-injuring. This 
kind of communication then runs well below the traditional sender–receiver model 
and suggests a kind of intercorporeality or inter-bodily resonance, an ‘entanglement 
between self and other’ (Dolezal 2017, p. 320). There is a sense in which these dif-
ficult feelings and lived experiences had been communicated from child to parent 
who has taken them on, albeit from her own position and point of view. What might 
conventionally be considered ‘private’, without becoming public, becomes a shared 
state and experience.
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Toward a (co‑)embodied phenomenology of self‑injury
In Saussure’s classic Course in General Linguistics, there is a famous diagram of 
two disembodied heads with the brain and mouth of each connected by wire-like 
lines to the ears of the other (2013 [1916], p. 14). In many ways the diagram nicely 
illustrates the concept of the homo clausus: both individuals are closed and sealed 
into their own inner worlds; information about thoughts, moods and feelings are 
inaccessibly locked up inside the private inner space of each person, unless and until 
that person chooses to communicate this information to another. But obviously the 
diagram also speaks to the linear sender–receiver communication paradigm that we 
mentioned in the introduction. Indeed, the wires in this diagram recall that Shan-
non and Weaver’s highly influential version of this paradigm grew out of their war-
time experience in the Bell Telephone Laboratories (Shannon and Weaver 1949). 
And if we understand communication in this telephonic way, then we must think 
of self-injury as something that is not communicative at all: a completely closed 
psycho-affective and behavioural circuit. Of course, this is not an uncommon model, 
in either public or professional discourse about self-injury (Chandler 2016; Steggals 
2015; Steggals et al. 2020), but it is wholly inadequate for understanding the subtle 
and ambiguous excitations in the communicative field of the family hone that we 
have described above.
The key to this apparent paradox is that both the homo clausus and the 
sender–receiver communication paradigm are not just abstract ideas, but potent 
discourses that inform and regulate the normative conditions of people’s experi-
ence, as well as the psychosocial patterns of their subjectivity (Foucault 1991 
[1975]). This is why we find these discourses evident in the thoughts, feelings and 
practices common to self-injury. And, if we follow Steggals’ argument (2015), it 
is the reason why self-injury can even be understood as a kind of symbolic crys-
tallisation or hyperbolic performance of precisely these discourses. But, even if 
our personal and cultural imaginary is formed through such individualistic dis-
courses, we must remember the inherent irony that these are nonetheless social 
discourses: they shape and regulate the pattern of our subjectivity, but they do not 
determine its formal structure (see for example Turner’s ‘ontological foundation-
alism’, 1992; also O’Neill 1989). So, as Siri Hustvedt points out, no matter how 
we may imagine ourselves, we ‘are not closed, wholly autonomous creatures. We 
are born of another person and open to others from birth on, this openness is by 
its very nature ambiguous, reciprocal, and mixed’ (2017, pp. 380–381). This of 
course is a longstanding perspective in sociology, axiomatic in the work of Sim-
mel (2009 [1908]), Elias (1994 [1939]) and Goffman (1963, 1967, 1968). But it is 
also key to the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty (1962, 1968) who makes clear 
that this openness to others has major implications for how we think about the 
communicative power of social life under conditions of self-injury: he explains 
that ‘[w]e must reject the prejudice which makes inner realities out of love, hate 
or anger, leaving them accessible to one single witness; the person who feels 
them. Anger, shame, hate and love... exist on this face or in those gestures, not 
hidden behind them’ (1971, p. 52).
281‘I couldn’t say the words’: communicative bodies and spaces…
This is the picture we believe our data demonstrates: even as our participant’s 
stories describe people closing down at the level of normative interpersonal commu-
nication, of the wires between sender and receiver being disconnected, what we find 
is not the erasure of communication but rather the disclosure of the many ambigu-
ous, reciprocal and mixed communications that exist beneath this level and that are 
articulated through a fundamentally communicative body. To understand how this 
works between people and within spaces affected by self-injury, we need to move 
beyond the homo clausus and the sender–receiver communication paradigm: in fact, 
we must complete Saussure’s diagram ‘by drawing out the moving bodies under-
neath the talking heads’ (Meyer et al. 2017, p. xvi).
This of course, is a significant and ongoing challenge. In our remaining space we 
restrict ourselves to noting four key elements of this challenge that help to interpret 
our data picture and position it within a broader intellectual context. These are: that 
the body is a foundational part of our subjectivity; that the body is extended in living 
space; that the body is essentially relational; and that the body is communicative.
The body as foundational
Drawing the bodies out on to Saussure’s diagram should not be done by simply add-
ing them on to a pre-existing and atomic self but rather by disclosing what was there 
all along: that the body is a not just a fundamental but also a foundational part of 
our subjectivity. This of course has been a key insight in embodied sociology (Wil-
liams and Bendelow 1998; see Crossley 2001; Turner 2008), phenomenology (Mer-
leau-Ponty 1962, 1968, 1971; Gallagher 2005), and in research on intercorporeality 
(Meyer et al. 2017). Bodies are not simply vehicles or signalling devices under the 
control of an autonomous and interior mind, mere objects or ‘Körper’ to use Hus-
serl’s term (2002 [1913]) (later taken up by Plessner, and now common currency 
in both the phenomenology and sociology of the body: see Wehrle 2019). They are 
‘Leib’: the living shape of our sensual and sensate consciousness, the very substance 
of our subjective presence and mobile activity in the world. Otherwise put, it is the 
bodies and not the heads that should have been drawn first.
The body as extended
One of the things that stands out in our data is the way that material spaces, their 
dimensions and objects, must be understood as living spaces. That is, spaces blended 
into, and acting as extensions of a kind of co-embodied system. Spaces then, that 
are imbued with intercorporeal and intersubjective meaning and that are part of the 
communicative field of the family home. This idea that the mind is embodied and 
that the embodied mind is extended and distributed through the body’s environment, 
has gained much traction in recent years (Clark 2011), tracking similar trends in 
sociology to take things seriously (Komter 2001). Behnke (2008) notes that living 
spaces are often places where numerous bodies extend, and interact with one another 
through these extensions, forming an ‘inter-kinesthetic field’. To understand the 
interacting and communicative body then, such as we find it in cases of self-injury, 
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we have to understand this inter-kinesthetic field that embodied subjects create 
through their dwelling activity and the ‘sedimented traces’ of this activity (Meyer 
et al. 2017, p. xvii). While the inter-kinesthetic can be inferred from the intercorpo-
real and the intersubjective, as it has been here, it should perhaps be acknowledged 
as its own level or region of communicative activity in future research on self-injury.
The body as relational
If the Leib or lived body is foundational to subjectivity, and it is something extended 
though a co-embodied system to create inter-kinesthetic fields out of shared spaces, 
then it is something that is not just shaped by biology but also by action and inter-
action. As Behnke puts it, ‘my body is something I do’, but crucially he adds, ‘I do 
not do it alone’ (1997, p. 198, our emphasis). Perhaps ironically then, given how 
central the epistemology of the Körper (Foucault 2012 [1963]) and the discourse of 
the homo clausus have been, it is the body that most clearly discloses that we are not 
wholly bounded individuals at all, beings onto whom relationships are ‘added’,2 but 
rather beings who can be individuals only because we are embedded within a co-
embodied matrix of social and worldly relationships. While it is though this matrix 
that individual subjects learn to distinguish between themselves and others, the 
shared infrastructure of intercorporeal, intersubjective and inter-kinesthetic commu-
nication remains active and so people never fully separate from one another (Kins-
bourne and Jordan 2009). This is not to suggest however that the personal should 
be wholly effaced in favour of the social: rather, it is to draw out all the ways the 
personal and the social are mutually implicated, informed and entangled. As Zahavi 
explains:
[I]t is not possible simply to insert intersubjectivity [including the primary 
intersubjectivity of the intercorporeal] somewhere within an already estab-
lished ontology; rather, the three regions, ‘self’, ‘others’ and ‘world’ belong 
together; they reciprocally illuminate one another, and can only be understood 
in their interconnection (2001, p. 166).
Nor is it to suggest that such a co-embodied system implies a sort of primal social 
harmony. As Alphonso Lingis notes, ‘[t]he cartography that maps out the distances 
and directions across which we identify and constrain one another maps out the 
ways that we [both] torment and gratify one another’ (1994, p. 54).
The body as communicative
As the evidence of intercorporeal, intersubjective and inter-kinesthetic communica-
tion empirically sketched and theoretically described above demonstrates, our bod-
ies are fundamentally communicative bodies (Frank 1991; O’Neill 1989). Describ-
ing what this means, O’Neill notes that the body is the ‘necessary organ’ of our 
2 Strathern (1992) regards this as a fundamental understanding of the person within English kinship.
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social and discursive lives, ‘the bio-text upon which the principal social institutions 
inscribe themselves’ (1989, p. 3). So, we have the bodies that we have because of 
the communication of discourse and flesh; but equally, we have the institutions and 
discourses that we have for the same reason (ibid). However, as Frank makes clear, 
when the normative regulation of this feedback loop between discourse and body 
fails, the body does not simply become passive but rather speaks out with a code 
of its own making: ‘[t]he body continues to be formed among institutions and dis-
courses, but these are now media for its expression. For the communicative body 
institutions and discourses now enable more than they constrain’ (1991, p. 80, our 
emphasis). If the discourses of the homo clausus and the sender–receiver commu-
nication paradigm are still present in the phenomenon of self-injury then, they are 
nonetheless transformed by the process of the communicative body ‘acting out’ in 
its estranged mode. They become, as Steggals argued, less a set regulative norms 
than the source material for a kind of transgressively hyperbolic bricolage. It is not 
that the truth of self-injury is contained within these discourses then, nor can self-
injury be understood when such discourses are taken for ontology. Rather, these 
discourses have become the productive and enabling media for the communicative 
body to ‘act out’ and speak up, to disclose and draw itself out beneath the talking 
head that has fallen silent.
Conclusion
If self-injury has commonly suggested to us a purely private and secret phenomena, 
we must remember that the vernacular use of ‘private’ and ‘secret’ has never implied 
a hermetically sealed individualism. The phrase ‘private life’ tends to refer to peo-
ple’s close and intimate relationships, while secrets are often shared amongst con-
fidants without them being considered either inauthentic, or secrets no longer. The 
capacity and the desire to mask things or keep them secret is itself an accomplish-
ment of social communicative capabilities because ‘secrecy constitutes a relational 
experience between people’ (van Manen and Levering 1996, p. 11). Smart has even 
suggested that we need to investigate the social history of secrets in the same way 
that Elias investigated the social history of manners, as part of the civilising process 
that forms homo clausus (Smart 2007, p. 110).
The disturbances and excitations of the communicative field of the family home 
that we have described here, demonstrate that self-injury cannot be thought of as 
something that is either individual or social, secret or communicated, private or 
shared. What we have found is that the personal is not something wholly contained 
within the boundaries of the body, but something that extends outward through 
other bodies, relationships and spaces. At the same time, the social is not something 
wholly exterior but rather something that saturates us, informing our most private 
thoughts, feelings and orientations. The personal and the social necessarily impli-
cate one another. As such, while self-injury may be experienced as intensely per-
sonal, it is nonetheless best conceptualised as a richly communicative phenomenon: 
even if that communication is not an overt and fully deliberate interpersonal com-
munication of the kind envisaged by the sender–receiver paradigm. A successful 
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sociology of self-injury then, must include alongside any analysis of interpersonal 
communication, an appreciation of the intercorporeal, intersubjective, inter-kines-
thetic. And this means that any account of the body in self-injury must understand 
this body as foundational to subjectivity, meaningfully extended through its envi-
ronment, fundamentally relational, and deeply communicative. Indeed, self-injury 
offers a particularly powerful case study with which to think through a more com-
plex model of communication and the role of the communicative body; something 
that ought to be of significant interest to the full range of sociologies of everyday life 
and embodiment.
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